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Abstract:  Does the rejection of pure proceduralism show that we should adopt Brettschneider’s 
value theory of democracy?  The answer, this paper suggests, is ‘no’.  There are a potentially 
infinite number of incompatible ways to understand democracy, of which the value theory is, at 
best, only one.  The paper illustrates and substantiates its claims by looking at what the secret 
ballot shows us about the importance of privacy and democracy.    Drawing on the reasons to 
reject Mill’s arguments for open voting, in a previous paper by the paper explains that people’s 
claims to privacy have a constitutive, as well as an instrumental,  importance to democratic 
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government, which is best seen by attending to democracy as a practice, and not merely as a 
distinctive set of values.  
 
Privacy is an important democratic value, and the justification for protecting a right to privacy is 
not reducible to the way legal protections for privacy might promote political participation.  This 
is the central claim about privacy in Corey Brettschneider’s Democratic Rights: The Substance of Self-
Government. 2 According to Brettschneider, privacy is intrinsically valuable if we care about 
democracy, and that value is connected to the importance that a democratic society will attach to 
people’s abilities to develop and exercise their capacities for personal reflection, judgement and 
action.   
I wholeheartedly accept these claims, and have defended them myself, most recently in a little 
book, On Privacy.3 However, while I share Brettschneider’s belief that it is important to 
distinguish democratic from undemocratic conceptions of privacy, I believe that his value theory 
of democracy unduly constrains what can count as an example of the former, in part because it 
arbitrarily circumscribes the values which might justify democratic practices and institutions.  So 
while I agree with Brettschneider that there is no purely procedural conception of democracy, 
for the reasons described by Joshua Cohen,4 democratic politics and experimentation can 
themselves expand and change our conceptions of democracy.  This means that our ideas about 
the values which underpin and justify democratic government cannot be ordered and neatly 
boxed in the ways that the ‘value theory’ suggests.  This has implications for the ways that we 
think about the democratic aspects of privacy, and of the relations between the personal and 
political on democratic principles. 
 In order to make these arguments, I will start by presenting and evaluating Brettschneider’s 
value theory of democracy, and its relationship to his critique of pure proceduralism.  I will then 
examine the implications that he believes this has for the value of privacy, before using the secret 
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ballot to illustrate and substantiate my concerns with Brettschneider’s  conceptions of privacy 
and democracy.  However, a word about terminology may be helpful before proceeding.   
There are many different ways to think about privacy, and the best way to define a right to 
privacy for moral and legal purposes has dominated discussions about the value of privacy for 
many years.5  For our purposes, I think we can avoid these by thinking of people’s claims to 
privacy as an amalgam of claims to seclusion and solitude, intimacy, domestic and familial 
association, confidentiality and control of personal information.  Although Brettschneider is 
primarily concerned with the justification of what Americans call ‘decisional privacy’ in matters 
of sex and reproduction,6 I think it is helpful to try to connect people’s interests in intimate 
choice with their interests in seclusion and solitude, even if we may sometimes choose to 
disaggregate the composite conception of privacy for  various purposes.  7 
I will also be assuming that democracies can take a variety of different forms, whether we think 
of them in more idealistic or realistic terms.  We will therefore want to avoid assuming that 
democracies have to fit some favoured institutional model and that there is therefore some 
uniquely correct answer to the question whether democracies should be presidential or 
parliamentary, majoritarian or consociational,8 or how far they need to have the formalised 
legislative procedures and bodies of law with which most of us are familiar. Taking seriously the 
idea that many different types of association and relationship can be democratic, suggests that we 
are likely to have a rather impoverished idea of the variety of forms that democracy can take, of 
which the ones we know are, at best, a subset.  And taking seriously the fact that our societies are 
imperfectly democratic, commends modesty in taking our societies as models of democracy.  
That said, we have to start our thinking from somewhere, and the place I suggest we start is with 
the familiar assumption that democracies are countries whose governments are elected by 
universal suffrage, and where people have an equally weighted vote and are entitled to participate 
in collective decisions, no matter their wealth, knowledge, virtue, or pedigree.  However, it is 
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important to remember that lotteries, not elections, were considered the quintessentially 
democratic form of political appointment in the classical and renaissance republics.9  I will also 
assume that democracies require ‘one rule for rich and poor’ and for governors and governed- 
that they are constitutional governments – although the extent to which democracies must have 
formal systems of law, and distinctive legal institutions, is by no means settled.  Still, whether 
democracies have the clear separation of powers that Americans aim for, and whether or not 
they make room for customary law of various sorts, I assume that democracies must have well-
known and generally effective protections for political, civil and personal freedoms of 
association, expression and choice.  
Democracies on this picture can take many forms – some will look more like Brazil or India, 
others more like Sweden, Switzerland, Italy or America.  However, allowing for the familiar gaps 
between ideals and reality, they will entitle people to form a variety of associations through 
which to advance their interests, express their ideas and beliefs, and fulfil their duties as they see 
them.  Democracies, therefore are characterised by protection not just for political parties, 
unions, interest groups and churches but also by the protections they secure for soccer-clubs, 
scientific societies, families, charities, and associations of the like-minded.       
    
A. The Critique of Pure Proceduralism and the Value Theory of Democracy.  
A proceduralist view of democracy is one which sees democratic government as a way to make, 
justify and execute collectively binding decisions.  Democracy can therefore be compared to 
other ways of making, justifying and executing collectively binding decisions – whether these are 
theocratic, autocratic, monarchic, despotic or plutotcratic or, as is often the case, some 
combination of them all.   Because democracy is, indeed, a distinctive way of organising social 
life, based on distinctive ways of taking and justifying collective decisions, any credible 
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conception of democracy is likely to have a procedural aspect.  What differentiates purely 
procedural views of democracy from the alternatives, however, is the idea that the only way 
adequately to distinguish democratic from undemocratic government is by reference to the 
procedures used for taking and justifying collective decisions .  By implication, a purely 
proceduralist view of democracy implies that we cannot distinguish democratic from 
undemocratic governments based on the policies they uphold, or the results of those policies, 
nor by the ideals and values that they use to justify collective policies.   
This is not simply because democracies and undemocratic forms of government may look rather 
similar in the ends they seek and in the way that they justify those ends – though that is certainly 
true.  Rather – at least for contemporary proponents of purely procedural views of democracy, 
such as John Hart Ely, 10 the problem with these other, more substantive, views of democratic 
government (and, therefore, of the differences between it and other forms of government), is 
that there are a potentially infinite variety of values, ends and ideals which informed, thoughtful, 
morally sensitive and democracy-supporting people might endorse, and many of these are 
mutually inconsistent.  So, some democratic citizens think that the pursuit of truth is the most 
important thing in life; for others it is the pursuit of liberty; for others it is justice, and so on.  
The people who hold these views are not necessarily mistaken morally; nor need they be wilfully 
indifferent to facts.  They may be quite aware that other decent, informed, thoughtful people 
disagree with them, and may be perfectly happy to negotiate those differences in matters of 
collective importance.  But what they cannot do – or so the pure proceduralist believes- is 
negotiate with other democrats based on an allegiance to some shared ideal or set of moral 
values,  because these are likely to be too contested to be useful. 
So, the pure proceduralist believes, democracies can only justify collective decisions procedurally 
– by reference to the fact that they were taken in ways that are democratic- and not by reference 
to substantive ends desired or achieved, or by reference to certain virtues or opportunities 
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created and sustained.  Whatever the case with other forms of government, the pure 
proceduralist believes, the freedom to form and debate our differences, essential to democratic 
politics, means that there is no extra-procedural way to negotiate the conflicts of interest, belief 
and value amongst democratic citizens and, therefore, no way to distinguish democratic from 
undemocratic policies, values, beliefs, results.  Standardly, a democratic political procedure is 
described in terms of constitutional government plus universal suffrage and majority rule – but 
there is no reason why a pure proceduralist must describe the central democratic decision 
mechanisms this way.  The key point, for our purposes, is that a pure proceduralist thinks that all 
descriptive, evaluative and justificatory claims about democracy are really claims about the way to 
make collectively binding decisions, and so can only be understood by reference to the different 
ways that collective decisions might be made, or to the outcomes and consequences of these 
decisions.  
As Joshua Cohen has shown, while democratic government indeed has an important procedural 
element, the pure proceduralist is wrong to think that we can identify a set of democratic 
procedures without appealing to assumptions about what is valuable, desirable, useful and right.11  
Decision-procedures don’t come with a label neatly attached to them that says ‘this is 
democratic’ or ‘this is monarchic’.  Not all forms of universal suffrage are democratic so, to 
know which ones are and which ones are not, we need to make reference to the purposes of 
democratic government, understood as a form of government which seeks to treat people in 
certain distinctive ways – as sovereigns, as free and equal citizens, as the locus of political 
authority, or however else one wishes to think of it.  And as long as we think that democratic 
governments have claims to legitimacy that alternatives lack, we will need to identify those 
distinctive democratic purposes in a way that reflects our belief that democracy is valuable.  So 
the first reason why a purely procedural view of democracy is untenable is that we cannot 
identify democratic procedures without making background assumptions about the nature and 
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value of democratic government, assumptions that we need in order to resolve controversy over 
which procedures are democratic, or which forms of procedure are democratic under which 
conditions. 
However, once it is clear that we need values, however contested or controversial, to identify 
what is to count as a democratic procedure, it becomes clear that people who hold different, 
even incompatible values, may still be willing and able to reason about these, and to modify their 
theoretical and practical conclusions about what is collectively required in light of their 
deliberations.  So if people with conflicting views are capable of accepting democratic political 
procedures as a way of arbitrating their differences and legitimising binding outcomes, this is at 
least partly because they hold sufficient shared values and objectives to make such procedures an 
acceptable way of proceeding.   But, in that case, they may seek to resolve their differences, and 
to legitimise collective outcomes, by appealing directly to the substantive values and objectives 
that they share in common, or by arguing about what these might be, and how best to describe 
and pursue them.   
Now, according to Brettschneider, rejecting a purely proceduralist conception of democracy 
means that we should embrace what he calls ‘a value theory’ of democracy.  And, he believes, the 
best way to understand a value theory of democracy is to treat three values as essential to any 
democratic conception of government.  Those three values are, he claims, political autonomy, 
equality of interests and reciprocity, 12 and it is in light of these three values that he seeks to 
illuminate and resolve a variety of controversies about the rights and duties of democratic 
citizens.   These three values are core democratic values, he argues, because they protect the 
rights of citizens as political participants, and also guarantee them certain substantive protections 
from state coercion.13  They, ‘support the notion of democratic citizens as free, equal and 
reasonable rulers’, 14 although there is nothing inherently democratic about them. 15  
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According to Brettschneider, privacy is necessary for citizens to develop their capacities for 
autonomy, because it is implicit in the capacity for independent judgement.16  So, while ‘nothing 
in my claim relies on the suggestion that privacy is an empirically necessary conditions for these 
capacities to develop…a presumption of privacy respects citizens’ capacities for a sense of good 
and for judgement even if they could be developed in regimes that offer no such respect’. 17 
More simply, Brettschneider argues that it would be morally inconsistent ‘to allow citizens’ rights 
to rule others but not to rule themselves’.18  So, he implies, a commitment to democratic 
government implies a commitment to protecting individual privacy, because ‘if citizens are 
granted the right to make decisions for others by virtue of their participation in the political 
process, it should follow that they have the right to make decisions for themselves in the most 
important matters of personal life’.  
I have great sympathy for the idea that there is something morally and politically illogical about 
espousing democratic government and rejecting the idea that people are entitled to privacy.  So 
far as I can see, the empirical and normative ideas about how the world works and what people 
and politics actually look like and how should look like, which underpin any democratic 
conception of government, imply that people are entitled to keep some things to themselves, if 
they so wish; that they are entitled to form families and have and care for the resulting children, 
if they so wish; and are entitled to certain forms of seclusion if they so wish.  And I believe, as 
does Brettschneider, that the best way to work out what these are is by reflecting on what we 
know about democratic values.  However, unlike Brettschneider, I am sceptical that we can rely 
on democratic values alone to clarify the nature and value of privacy, and my scepticism is 
connected to my doubts about the value theory of democracy as it stands.  So, let me first 
explain my concerns with the latter, before clarifying my worries about the former.  
B. Democracy: Procedural and Substantive. 
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My worries about Brettschneider’s views can be summarised as follows: first, I do not think that 
the value theory follows from the rejection of pure proceduralism, as there are a potentially 
infinite number of conceptions of democracy which will combine substantive and procedural 
ideas in some plausible and helpful way. Put simply, the fact that it is wrong to identify 
democracy in procedural terms alone does not show that the best way to characterise it is in terms 
of a supposedly distinctive set of values, or that there is a single best way to characterise 
democratic government.  Absent reasons to think there is only one way to be democratic, we 
might expect that there might be many contrasting ways to distinguish democratic from 
undemocratic governments, some of which will place more emphasis on values, others more 
emphasis on the practice of self-government and still others which may be more procedural in 
emphasis.  
 Second, even if we wish to formulate a value theory of democracy, as opposed, say, to a 
pragmatic or institutional one, I do not believe that the three values that Brettschneider picks out 
have the iconic status which he attributes to them. The difficulties are particularly evident with 
the choice of reciprocity as the third member of the trio, since this isn’t a value normally 
identified with what is most distinctive about democracy.  However, the real difficulty is that 
how one describes a value, and distinguishes core from periphery, obviously depends on the map 
of the moral world with which one starts.  If one takes seriously, as we should, the idea that there 
are many reasonable, but mutually inconsistent, ways to describe and evaluate moral experience, 
then it seems most unlikely that there are only three core democratic values.  Although for the 
sake of convenience we may want to focus on a few values that we take to be especially 
important to democratic government, understood historically, or in some other way, it is wrong 
to think that talk of equality, autonomy and reciprocity is automatically more democratic or 
evocative than talk of participation, representation and accountability, let alone more familiar 
trios such as life, liberty and happiness. As Brettschneider notes, there is nothing automatically 
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democratic about his trio – so they require careful definition in order to be democratic.19  What is 
to count as the standard for success in that venture, therefore, needs careful articulation.  If, as 
he claims, the justification of his set is that these ‘support the notion of democratic citizens as 
free, equal and reasonable rulers’,20  it is natural to wonder whether that is not true of any 
number of different values- or, indeed, whether a value theory of democracy is not just an effort 
to work out an ideal of self-government under an assumed name.  
 Third, even if we wish to use Brettschneider’s trio of autonomy, equality and reciprocity instead 
of the more usual liberty, equality and fraternity,(or life, liberty and happiness),  it is unclear why 
we should interpret the three values in the way that he suggests.  For example, why is equality of 
interests a more important form of equality, from a democratic perspective, than equality of 
welfare, or equality of rights and opportunities?  Why should we understand the democratic 
value of reciprocity to lie in ‘mutual reason giving’21 rather than in a less Habermasian, but more 
pragmatic concern to ensure that those who lose on the swings gain on the roundabouts, or that 
there are no permanent winners or losers in democratic competitions for scarce resources?  In 
short, Brettschneider’s conception of democracy strikes me as unreasonably narrow, and I see 
nothing about the rejection of pure proceduralism which requires us to suppose that there is only 
one form of democracy (majoritarian, constitutional, and a rather idealised form of American 
government), and one set of values which is sufficient and necessary to characterise the 
differences between democratic and undemocratic government.  
In light of my concerns about the gap between the scope for diverse understandings of 
democracy, which the abandonment of pure proceduralism invites, and the restrictive 
conclusions about democracy which Brettschneider appears to draw, it may be helpful to spell 
out the problems with a purely proceduralist conception of privacy, and the way in which 
Brettschneider seeks to respond to them.  I will then say something about the problems that I 





Impure Proceduralism and Privacy.  
On a purely proceduralist view of democracy, we cannot say that privacy is valuable, let alone 
that it deserves protection as a moral or legal right, because of its intrinsic importance – at least, 
not unless we can show that there is no democratic procedure that can be described without 
valuing privacy.  That, obviously, is a tall order – although it should be noted that elections based 
on universal suffrage are not an inherent part of the democratic ideal, given the importance of 
lotteries, rather than elections, to classical and renaissance understandings of the ideal.  Pure 
proceduralism, therefore, lends itself to the idea that privacy can only be justified instrumentally, 
because of its contribution to democratic elections, rather than as an essential part of an ideal of 
self-government by free, equal and reasonable people.  So, we might think, if privacy is to  be a 
democratic value, that value must be subordinate, and is likely to be characterised in terms of the 
ways that protections for solitude, confidentiality and intimacy (to take my earlier trio) are either 
necessary for or - less strongly - contribute to,  democratic decision procedures.   
The standard justification of the secret ballot – to which Brettschneider appears to appeal, 22 
would be an example of such a conception of privacy.  On this picture, privacy is not justified 
because of its own importance or value, but simply as a way of protecting other things that are 
important- democratic elections.  By implication, were privacy no good at doing this, or were 
other things better at doing so, there would be no case for thinking privacy valuable.  Hence if, 
as Patricia Boling and Wendy Brown appear to believe, privacy inevitably depoliticises things that 
should be open to public contestation, or if, as is sometimes suggested, privacy is fundamentally 
at odds with freedom of (political) information, then there would be no way to justify it on 
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democratic grounds, unless its deficiencies from a procedural perspective are outweighed by 
some rather considerable procedural advantages. 23 
But that is the problem with pure proceduralism, not with privacy:  for it treats everything as 
instrumental to the goal of democratic procedures, and ignores the need to clarify what these are, 
or why they are valuable.  Rejecting a purely proceduralist view of democracy, therefore, means 
that we can expand the range of ways in which we might distinguish democratic from 
undemocratic forms of privacy – or, conversely, the range of reasons we might have to reject 
privacy as irrelevant, or even inimical, to democratic government.   
Put simply, the claim that privacy is intrinsically desirable, not just instrumentally valuable, 
becomes open for discussion once we reject a purely procedural view of democracy, and this 
appears to be the reason why Brettschneider attaches so much importance to showing that the 
value theory of democracy supports the claim that privacy is intrinsically valuable.  However, 
there is nothing about rejecting pure proceduralism that commits us to the idea that privacy is 
intrinsically valuable, rather than desirable because of its contribution to democratic values such 
as freedom or equality, or to democratic institutions or habits.  Indeed, there is nothing about 
rejecting pure proceduralism that commits us to the view that privacy is valuable to begin with.   
A great deal of work in Brettschneider’s account of privacy is, therefore, done by the Rawlsian 
assumption that people are entitled to pursue their own conception of the good, and that there is 
therefore something odd, even illogical, in supposing that people are entitled to share in 
governing each other, but are not entitled to make important personal decisions for themselves.  
Unfortunately, though, if we do not start with such an assumption – and it is unclear why we 
should think of it as a starting point, rather than a possible corollary, of democratic government-  
the sense of contradiction and bizarreness that Brettschneider feels when thinking of democracy 
without privacy, may be altogether absent. Hence, there would be no reason to think it 
contradictory to value democracy, but not privacy.   
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That leaves us with Brettschneider’s claim that privacy is intrinsically valuable because of its links 
to autonomy.24  But how this argument goes is never really spelled out, and the example of the 
secret ballot which is used to illustrate the point does not help.  This is partly because the secret 
ballot seems to be concerned with privacy as solitude, anonymity and confidentiality – and 
therefore unrelated to the decisional privacy that Brettschneider seeks to defend; partly because it 
is unclear what the secret ballot tells us about the intrinsic, as opposed to the instrumental, value 
of privacy; and partly because there is no reason to suppose that the most important aspects of 
privacy must be intrinsic, rather than instrumental, if we care about democratic government.   
So, let us turn to the example of the secret ballot and see what it might tell us about the value of 
privacy, bearing in mind that privacy may not be valuable at all, if we care about democracy, or 
that its value may depend on the particular form of democracy we care about.  Moreover, in light 
of the different ways we might carve up the moral world, it may be a mistake to attach too much 
importance to the differences between instrumental and intrinsic values, as the examples can 
often be reformulated in terms of the other, and because it is often their shared factual or 
counterfactual premises which are critical to the success or weakness of value claims. 25 
D. The Standard Justification of the Secret Ballot 
According to Brettschneider, the Secret Ballot illustrates the importance of privacy to democratic 
politics.  ‘In deciding how to vote, citizens are entitled to freedom from coercion and to a 
“private space” in which to make up their own minds through the exercise of political judgment.  
The privacy of the voting booth serves to enhance this sense that we are free to make our own 
decisions without external coercion.  This rationale also extends beyond procedural protections 
in the paradigmatic case of voting to the general role privacy rights play in a citizen’s capacity to 
think of themselves as rulers’.26 
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This is a perfect statement of the standard justification of the secret ballot, and of its importance 
to democratic government.  This standard justification for the secret ballot is that it is necessary 
in order to prevent corruption, coercion and intimidation from undermining the fairness of 
elections.  The secret ballot enables people who want to discuss their vote to do so – they are 
free to tell anyone they want how they voted, and to urge others to vote likewise.  Hence the 
secret ballot is compatible with freedom of expression, including the freedom to ask other 
people how they intend to vote, or how they have voted.  However, the secret ballot means that 
people are free to refuse to answer such questions, and cannot be legally required to do so.   
This justification for the secret ballot is instrumental, however, and tells us less about the 
importance of privacy per se, than about the importance of preventing bribery and intimidation 
from wrecking democratic elections. Brettschneider is surely right to note that ‘Citizens do not 
think about politics at a particular moment or in a particular space that can be limited 
politically…Since our capacity for political thought is intertwined…with our capacity for thought 
in general, a society concerned to respect either of these capacities should value citizens’ ability 
to be free from coercion’.27  However, this still does not look like a reason to think that privacy is 
intrinsically valuable if we care about democracy.  So it is worth considering the limitations of the 
standard justification of the secret ballot, before trying to draw some positive conclusions about 
the value of privacy, and what it tells us about the nature and justification of democratic 
government.  
E. The Limitations of the Standard Justification of the Secret Ballot 
The obvious advantages of the secret ballot in combating bribery and intimidation should not 
blind us to the difficulties of treating the secret ballot as justified only for this reason. Were the 
secret ballot justified only because it protects us from bribery and intimidation, we would have to 
suppose that, in their absence, there would be nothing wrong with forcing people to discuss their 
voting intentions and acts with anyone who asks. In fact, it was precisely because he believed this 
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that, after much agonising, Mill voted against the secret ballot, on the grounds that by the 1860s 
voters should have no serious fear of bribery or intimidation, and could be expected to stand up 
to pressure from others.28 More recently, Geoffrey Brennan and Phillip Pettit have argued that 
the secret ballot is undesirable, although sometimes necessary. 29 So, if the standard justification 
for the secret ballot is correct, we would have to concede, with Mill, Brennan and Pettit that 
there would be no objection to getting rid of it were it not that we were worried for the safety of 
voters and the fairness of elections.  
This seems unlikely.  Arguments for open voting suppose that because we can harm others by 
our vote, and vote on mistaken or immoral considerations, we should be forced to vote openly.  
That way, others can correct our mistakes and the prospect of being exposed as selfish, 
insensitive or stupid will promote morally sensitive and considered voting.30 However, open 
voting will only improve the quality of voting if there are enough other people willing and able to 
correct, rather than to ignore or approve, our defects. And, of course, we must assume that 
people who are immune to information and arguments when they are free not to listen to them 
will prove willing and able to accept them when forced to do so. So the case for open voting is 
problematic even if we abstract from problems of coercion and intimidation.  
 But the most serious problems with open voting lie elsewhere, and highlight the constitutive 
importance of privacy to democratic citizenship. Democratic citizens are entitled to vote whether 
or not others approve of this, or of their likely voting patterns.  They are entitled to a say in the 
way that they are governed whether they are rich or poor, well-educated or not.  By contrast, no 
one has a right to represent others politically unless they have been selected for the task.  While 
democratic legislators may be more vulnerable to intimidation than citizens – as they are 
relatively few in number, and hold special power and authority qua legislators - it is the former, 
not the latter, who must vote openly, not secretly.  Legislators have duties of accountability that 
citizens lack.  That is why the former have a duty to vote openly, although citizens, like 
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legislators, can vote wrongly because of factors such as fear, greed, carelessness, confusion or 
ignorance.   
Secret voting for citizens, then, reflects an important democratic idea: that citizens’ rights to vote 
do not depend on the approval of others, or on the demonstration of special virtues, attributes 
or possessions.  While democratic rights to freedom of expression and association mean that 
citizens are free to consult anyone they want, the secret ballot means that they can share in 
collectively binding decisions without having to bare their souls to anyone who asks. 31 
This, I think, is the core reason why the secret ballot is justified, and is justified even if secrecy 
comes at some cost to the wisdom, transparency and morality of decisions.  However, there is a 
second reason why the secret ballot is so important from a democratic perspective which, like 
the first, connects the value of privacy to membership in a democratic society, although here the 
case for privacy is more instrumental in nature although, as we will see, it also has important 
constitutive aspects too.   
Advocates of open voting assume that public shaming can be used to prevent and punish 
careless, selfish or ignorant voting.  But while it is possible that open voting might, on balance, 
improve the quality of voting, both public shaming and the threat of public shaming are hard to 
justify for wrongful voting. The problem is this: that public shaming is likely to be out of 
proportion to the harm committed, and out of proportion to the punishments, if any, deemed 
appropriate in similar cases.  
Public shaming is a blunt instrument, and likely to fall hardest on those who are unpopular, poor, 
shy and inarticulate, rather than on those who have committed the worst offences.  Nor do its 
punishments usually bear any relationship to the concerns for fairness, rehabilitation and 
prevention that constrain legal forms of punishment. So, even if it were possible that open 
voting really would cure careless, prejudiced or ignorant voting, it would fall foul of concerns for 
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fairness and equality.  Hence, modern democracies tend to be wary of public shaming as a way to 
prevent or to punish immorality: for its weight is likely to fall in ways that are morally arbitrary 
and that make it harder for us to see and treat each other as equals.32  
If these arguments are right, the justification of the secret ballot is more complicated than it first 
seems, both because secret voting for citizens, as opposed to legislators, helps to distinguish their 
respective power and duties, and because it reflects democratic concerns for the equality, public 
standing and fair treatment of citizens.  In a society with freedom of expression, we do not need 
to be forced into mini-tutorials in order to consider contrasting approaches to voting, and to our 
duties as citizens.  Nor will we lack opportunities to discuss our doubts, raise our questions, or 
advocate our beliefs about politics.  However, the secret ballot means that we are not forced to 
try to defend our view of the world to others who may be unable to understand or sympathise 
with it. Nor are we at risk of being turned into a public example for the edification, or merely the 
entertainment, of others.33 
 Privacy has intrinsic value, then, reflecting the importance that democracies attach to our ability 
to see and treat each other as equals.  We can think of this value as constitutive, not merely intrinsic, 
because it institutionalises the meaning of democratic citizenship - that citizens do not have to 
ask permission, or to defer to the opinions of others, in order to participate in politics.  So while 
it is important that the secret ballot helps to protect citizens from coercion and intimidation, as 
instrumental arguments for the secret ballot maintain, from a democratic perspective there is, in 
addition, a constitutive dimension to the secret ballot, reflecting the ways in which the secret 
ballot can be valuable for what it is, not just what it does.   
F. Democracy and the Constitutive Justification of the Secret Ballot 
The constitutive justification of the secret ballot, if I may call it that, helps to define the status of 
democratic citizenship, both in contrast to other conceptions of citizenship and in comparison 
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to the other types of relationship, rights and duties which people can have in a democratic 
society.34  It shares with republican conceptions of citizenship the idea that people’s right to vote 
reflects their legitimate interests in participating in collective decisions, and therefore in making 
decisions that can fundamentally affect the lives and wellbeing of others.  However, it denies that 
ordinary people can legitimately be required to defend their political beliefs to others, nor does it 
assume that democratic citizens must be capable of understanding and appreciating other 
people’s perspectives, even when they earnestly try to do so.  
In that sense, a democratic perspective on politics, as illustrated by the constitutive justification 
of the secret ballot, is more sensitive than the republican one to the possibility that ‘reasonable 
pluralism’ means that citizens may have little more in common than their shared citizenship. 35  
Hence what is required of citizens, in order to participate in politics, is necessarily different from, 
and less demanding than, what is required of those who seek to hold positions of special trust 
and responsibility for the lives of others.  
This point is particularly important because, as Anne Phillips has shown, republican concerns 
with dependency and domination may come at the price of insensitivity to inequalities once the 
threshold for ‘determining one’s own will’ has been reached.36  This appears to be one reason 
why Mill’s defence of open voting is hard to reconcile with democratic principles: because it is 
unclear why, as Mill assumes, citizens and legislators should face the same demands for scrutiny 
and justification, given the differences of power and responsibility between them.37   
Moreover, as the US Supreme Court recognised in NAACP v. Alabama,38 the ability to 
distinguish the privacy claims of leaders and ordinary members in a civil association can be 
critical to the ability to reconcile the responsibilities of associations to outsiders – and, we might 
add, to their members- with freedom of association.  Granted that the context in which the 
Court reached its judgement was marked by Alabama’s effort to beat back, quite literally, 
demands for racial equality pressed by the civil rights movement, its point was not limited to the 
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civil rights context.39  Hence it provides, I believe, a helpful tool for thinking more generally 
about the claims of freedom of association, equality, security and privacy from a democratic 
perspective.   
However, if the secret ballot suggests that a democratic perspective on politics is different from a 
republican one, it also appears to be different from a liberal one.  Both share the belief that 
citizens have legitimate personal interests, which justify their claims to participate in politics, and 
which explain why people’s political rights cannot simply be interpreted as an emanation of their 
duties to others.  However, democratic claims to privacy – or so the secret ballot suggests- are 
concerned with affirming and protecting the status of citizens, not simply with protecting their 
interests.  So, the democratic case for the secret ballot does not depend, as does the liberal one, on 
the importance of protecting people from coercion and intimidation.  Instead, it is concerned 
also with the threat posed by public shaming and humiliation, even when this falls well short of 
coercion or intimidation.  The democratic concern, in this is case, is less with the public bases of 
self-respect, though Rawls was surely right to be concerned with this, than with the public bases 
of collective respect, given the difficulty and importance of the core democratic duty to see each other 
as people who are equally entitled to participate in government, and equally eligible to rule over others. 40  In 
short, while there are important instrumental aspects to the case for the secret ballot, there are 
no less important reasons to value privacy for what it is, not simply for what it does, if we care 
about democratic government.  
G. The Secret Ballot and Democratic Privacy 
What conclusions, if any, can we extract from this discussion of the secret ballot for a 
democratic conception of privacy?  The answers, roughly, are these: 
1) People are entitled to privacy even though this limits our ability to prevent and punish 
immorality, and even when what is at issue are true facts about a person’s beliefs, desires, 
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interests and actions.  Consequently, we should be wary of assuming that the truth and utility of 
information in and of itself makes it less private than it otherwise would be. Whatever the 
relevance of truth to the protection of freedom of expression in cases such as libel, the secret 
ballot suggests that people are entitled to keep at least some true facts about themselves to 
themselves, if they so wish, however interesting or useful such knowledge might be for others. 41    
 
2) People’s claims to privacy depend on their responsibilities,42 and the baseline for 
determining the weight and consequences of these for privacy is citizenship. By contrast, Mill’s 
argument for open voting equates citizen voting for legislators with legislative voting on 
collectively binding decisions, thereby implying that people are exercising a special responsibility 
when they choose their representatives, rather than exercising a basic right of citizenship.  A 
democratic conception of privacy, therefore, has no problem with the idea that the state is 
entitled to mandate equal parental guardianship for children, as with the UK’s Guardianship Act 
of 1973,43 or to hold parents legally responsible for the mistreatment of their children, because 
special powers entail special responsibility and, self-evidently, citizens do not need to be parents.  
Thus, in contrast to ideas about privacy which locate its content and justification in extra-
political rights or values, the case for the secret ballot, presented here, exemplifies an approach to 
privacy from within a democratic conception of morality.   
 
I therefore agree with Brettschneider that ‘the right of privacy is not about a lifestyle, it is about 
the conditions necessary to treat citizens as free and equal’.44   However, I do not think that this 
requires us sharply to distinguish instrumental and intrinsic justifications of privacy, as the 
former can be as important for our freedom and equality as the latter; nor to favour a ‘value’ 
theory of democracy, as compared to other alternatives to a purely procedural conception of 
democracy.  Indeed, it is partly by attending to political procedures that we can best understand 
the personal value of privacy: for once we have personal interests which set us apart from, and 
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even place us in conflict with others, the assurance of our public standing and rights can be 
reassuring and liberating. 
3) Privacy marks our status as citizens, with legitimate interests not only in protecting our 
own interests, but in acting on behalf of others. There is therefore no need to assume that 
people’s interests in privacy are self-interested, because the secret ballot suggests that a concern 
for the interests and feelings of others is a sufficient justification for claims to confidentiality, 
anonymity and even secrecy in many circumstances.   
 
This is particularly important when thinking about the relationship between privacy and freedom 
of the press, because while privacy inevitably limits what we know about others, such limitations 
can be necessary for people to express themselves freely.  Unwanted publicity can alter the 
nature and significance of an expressive act in ways that make it morally wrong.  Hence the 
importance, from a democratic perspective, of distinguishing freedom of expression from 
freedom of the press: for anonymity, confidentiality and even secrecy can be necessary to much 
legitimate expression, and duties of sensitivity, tact, respect and discretion, rather than self-
interest, may lie behind many of our needs for privacy. 45 
 
4) A complex structure of rights, duties, opportunities and resources is necessary for privacy 
to be democratic, rather than the prerogative of a privileged few,46 and for the negative 
consequences of privacy to be acceptable from a democratic perspective.  Too often the fact that 
legal rights to privacy have disadvantages have been thought reasons to deem privacy 
undemocratic, or to assume that the value of privacy means we have no duties to try to minimise 
the disadvantages its protection creates, or to compensate people, where those disadvantages are 




Although the costs of protecting privacy cannot be as readily identified with de-politicisation as 
critics suppose, they can be nonetheless real for that, and can include selfishness, loneliness, 
irrationality, conflict and even coercion.  So democracies cannot be indifferent to the ways that 
the costs of privacy are distributed, nor to the possibility of lessening those costs, where this is 
consistent with the rights of others.  For example, subsidies for the exercise of privacy rights 
might be justified in order to facilitate the formation of private associations by those who might 
otherwise face real obstacles in associating together – for example, the old, the sick, the young, 
the poor.   These need not take the form of subsidies for privacy rights specifically.  Such things 
as decent public transport, well-lit and safe streets, cheap use of rooms in the town hall, library, 
church, school or YMCA, for example, might facilitate the exercise of political as well as privacy 
rights, as might affordable and decent childcare and other familiar items, such as safe and 
effective contraception, which feminists habitually seek.  
 
Moreover, while a democratic justification of privacy provides no license for coercion and 
exploitation, whether we are concerned with the members of an association or outsiders, it 
provides no clear guidance in the case where an organization or association is avowedly 
undemocratic in its aims, but seeks to realise these through democratic means. 48  Because an 
organisation can be democratic on some dimensions and not on others it is, I think, a genuinely 
contentious matter whether or not privacy rights will extend to the internal organization and 
communication of racist, sexist and religiously intolerant organizations that do not engage in 
violence, deception or exploitation.   
 
The problem is familiar from debates on freedom of expression.  In the privacy case, the 
problem is that a group may be entitled to protection of its privacy, given some of the reasons 
for protecting privacy in a democracy, whereas on others the state would be justified in limiting 
its activities, scrutinizing its internal records and memos and monitoring its conversations.  
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Absent evidence that democracy is an all –or-nothing affair, rather than a matter of the degree to 
which different requirements, values and goals are met, there is no reason to assume that the 
protection of privacy should be free of this sort of problem.  After all, unless there is a simple 
test for democracy, there can be no simple way of determining the legitimate claims of 
individuals in a democracy.  The former, unfortunately, is ruled out by the idea of reasonable 
pluralism. 
 
  It therefore looks as though the ability to draw a sharp public/private distinction is undermined 
by the multiple dimensions of democracy, and by the difficulty of deciding a priori which of 
these are the most important.49  This means, I believe, that Brettschneider is wrong to think that 
we can, or need, sharply to distinguish perfectionist from egalitarian values, or the ways we think 
about the boundaries of privacy- which need to be publicly justifiable- from what happens within 
those boundaries, which need not.  Sometimes the differences between the personal and the 
political will be clear because, say, our desire for an abortion, or to teach our children about their 
grandparents’ lives, will have no significance for anyone’s political standing and opportunities.  
But it is a mistake to suppose that this must always be the case and that, therefore,  
considerations and values which citizens may espouse in regulating their affairs must be sharply 
distinguished, and distinguishable, from those which we use in the process of collectively 
justifying our rights and duties.50  
 
 
H. Conclusion: Politics, Values and Democratic Method 
This article has tried to show that we can use the example of the secret ballot to illuminate the 
nature and value of privacy, on a democratic conception of politics.  It has argued that there are 
a potentially infinite number of ways of describing and evaluating democracy of which, at best, 
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Brettschneider’s ‘value theory’ is but one.  Moreover, it has shown, attention to democratic 
practices and institutions, such as the secret ballot, can improve our understanding and 
interpretation of democratic values, and of what is distinctive about a democratic perspective on 
politics, even when compared to intellectual traditions which have heavily influenced the theory 
and practice of democracy.  
Finally, this article has shown that the differences between intrinsic and instrumental values 
should not be exaggerated in general, nor in the case of privacy.  As we have seen, privacy is 
valuable from a democratic perspective even though it means that we cannot detect or punish all 
forms of immorality.  But whether we attach more importance to the instrumental or intrinsic 
aspects of privacy depends on what other values we hold, and what threats to democracy we fear.  
Even the importance of legislative elections to democracy is a matter of dispute.  So, this paper 
concludes, while privacy is, in principle, as central to democratic government as Brettschneider’s 
favoured trio of autonomy, equality and reciprocity there may be other, better, ways to 
understand our interests in confidentiality, seclusion and intimacy and other, better, ways to 
understand the ideal of democratic government.  
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